interpreting Schelling, even on his own terms: 'any presentation of 'Schelling's philosophy' can only be either a presentation of some time-slice of it or else display the developmental history of a train of thought that was cut short only by Schelling's death' (p. 172). However, he summarises Schelling's development until 1809 as 'definitive of one of the major issues within post-Kantian idealism. Beginning with the issue of spontaneity and freedom, he had come to doubt its centrality and had even come to think of it as potentially dangerous' (p. 197). Although not untrue (especially in the context of the 1809 Of Human Freedom), this partial truth obscures the significance of Schelling's Naturphilosophie, which cannot be understood as primarily concerned with freedom; rather it sees the identity of the self as dependent on its place in nature. The self thus conceived ceases to be self-sufficient and transparent to itself, a clear departure from the Kantian-Fichtean emphasis on the subject's autonomy, spontaneity and self-sufficiency.
Naturphilosophie is of signal importance in the history of German Idealism for at least two reasons. First, Schelling's development of Naturphilosophie brought to the fore his differences from Fichte, both on a personal level, as their correspondence attests, and in the minds of the learned public. If Schelling had appeared to be Fichte's faithful disciple, it was on the basis of their shared understanding that they were Kant's rightful heirs; yet their increasingly divergent interpretations of that Kantian heritage made it harder and harder for them to see themselves as engaged in the same work. Initially, both attributed their differences to superficial difficulties such as their distinctly different styles of exposition, but the fundamental nature of their disagreements, previously only hinted at, burst into the open in Schelling's letter to Fichte of October 3rd 1801: "You must forgive me when I say that your entire writing shows a total misunderstanding of my ideas, which is quite natural inasmuch as you have never bothered to become familiar with them.... I however know all too well to what small region of consciousness nature is limited according to your conception. For you it has no speculative, but rather only a teleological meaning. Can you really be of the opinion that light exists only so that rational beings speaking with one another may also be enabled to see one another, and air, so that they can both hear and speak?' 1 Schelling could not accept Fichte's parochial concept of nature, not least because it was incompatible with his changing notion of what it was to be a human subject, a human who was also a part of nature. Indeed, it is not too much to say that Naturphilosophie both caused the estrangement between Fichte and Schelling and that the dispute over it rendered the rift permanent. On Pinkard's account, the break is more of a drifting apart: 'As Schelling worked out the implications of this view [of intellectual intuition], he also began to break gradually, then more decisively, with Fichte' (p. 177).
Secondly, Naturphilosophie is in its own right a grand achievement, however much that may have been forgotten today. For Pinkard, Naturphilosophie 'was to be an a priori study of the "Idea" of nature', constructing 'the aprioriview of nature that empirical investigations in fact presupposed in their experimental procedures' (p. 179). However, this characterisation holds true only for some of the naturphilosophischen works, such as the Ideen (1798) which, indeed, grandly proclaims in the supplement to the Introduction (added in 1802) that' [I] f one considers the Philosophy of Nature on its philosophical side... then up to the present time it is the most fully worked out endeavour to set forth the theory of Ideas and the identity of nature with the world of Ideas' (I, 2, 69). This does sound suspiciously like an occupation best pursued from a comfortable armchair. Yet the same work contains, in a painstakingly detailed section on recent discoveries about the properties of electricity, sharp criticism of'a lazy philosophy of nature, which believes it has explained everything if it postulates the causes of phenomena as basic materials in the bodies, from which they then emerge (fanquam Dens ex machind) only when needed to explain some phenomenon in the shortest and most convenient way'. Schelling goes on to explain that it is the observation of the actual natural phenomena that most directly leads the researcher to the underlying reality of nature: We do better, therefore, to consider the varying relation of electricity to different bodies rather more closely than has hitherto been done. Every discovery we make about the difference of the two electricities, is at the same time a discovery about electricity as such' (I, 2, 129). In the Einkitung %u dem Enhvurf'this point is insisted on even more specifically, as in the comment that mere observation alone (ein blosses Sehen) does not result in knowledge, but rather requires the direct participation of the scientist, such that 'nature is compelled to respond under determinate conditions, which usually do not exist in her or which must be arranged by others in order to exist. Such an intervention in nature is called an experiment. Every experiment poses a question to nature ...' (I, 3, 276). Indeed, 'originally we generally know nothing except through experience and by means of experience, and in this respect all of our knowledge consists of experience' (I, 3, 278). This is not to deny that Naturphilosophie, as Schelling went on to develop it, contained aprioristic elements, but these are only parts of a breathtakingly ambitious metaphysical vision of nature which with its attention to the organic and the aesthetic, has been variously called a 'forging of an organic bond between the self and nature' 2 and argued to constitute a *hermeneutics of nature' which has 'not necessarily outlived its significance for trying to understand what science is'. 3 The effort to combine Spinozistic monism with a dynamic concept of matter, and give the most central importance to the vitalistic and organic elements of nature made it easier to recognise the kinship of the preconscious forces in nature with the consciousness of man (itself the product of unconscious forces); this laid the groundwork for Schelling to argue that there are degrees of necessity and freedom in both nature and spirit. This culminated in a focus on the universe as a whole as the starting point of philosophy, which makes the conscious self only its highest expression; the ego (and with it the primacy of freedom) is then permanently dethroned from first place. This metaphysical shift of emphasis is complete in 1801 in Schelling's statement: "There is an idealism of nature and an idealism of the ego. The former is for me the original, the latter derived' (I, 4, 84). Schelling's identity philosophy is, if anything, less well served by Pinkard's interpretative scheme, since it too cannot be grasped as an attempt to grapple with the selfauthorisation of reason. For all its excesses and admitted ultimate failure, it remains a significant part of Schelling's intellectual development, serving as an important step toward the ultimate rejection of all 'negative' philosophy that made the move to the later 'positive' philosophy possible. Identity philosophy represents, or was claimed by Schelling to represent, the next logical step beyond Naturphilosophie. Clearly, after several years of expounding, in various forms, parallel systems of transcendental idealism and Naturphilosophie, there would come a time to explain how the two were in actuality merely opposed aspects of a single allencompassing unity. Schelling feels that he alone has earned the right to this higher standpoint, as he explains in the preface to Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801): 'I have always represented what I called philosophy of nature and transcendental philosophy as the opposite poles of philosophical activity. With the present exposition I locate myself in the indifference-point; one can rightly and confidently place oneself there only if one has previously constructed it from wholly opposite directions' (I, 4, 108) . The doctrine of subject-object identity claimed that the absolute was neither subjective nor objective, but the complete indifference-point of them both, thus transcending all the troublesome dualisms struggled with by those writing in the Kantian tradition.
How identity philosophy was to be practised, and the questions about what kind of thinking was required to attain the 'indifference-point' of the absolute did generate understandable confusion and criticism, and it is not unfair to refer to this. However, to leave the subject with a casual reference to Hegel's characterisation of'the absolute point of view' of identity philosophy as 'the night in which all cows are black' (p. 190) gives the impression that Hegel's attempted witticism was the last word on it, which is at least a misrepresentation by omission. 4 The significant role played by the major texts of the identity philosophy, such the first systematic attempts at a system of absolute idealism is passed over in silence. References to this period made later in the book, such as 'the "identity-philosophy" that had made him famous in his youth' (p. 319) and 'Schelling seemed to see his own earlier "identity-philosophy" as being a textbook example of the confusion of the realm of thought with the realm of existence' (p. 320), must then necessarily seem mysterious, since the brief earlier discussion presents identity philosophy as considerably more likely to produce infamy than fame, providing almost no context for why anyone might have taken it seriously.
However, the portrait of the middle and late Schelling is for the most part sympathetic and well-balanced, making a strong case that Schelling's inability to complete the Ages of the World manuscript and his subsequent turn from 'negative' to 'positive' philosophy can be understood as a break with the entire tradition begun by Kant. Yet the fact that Schelling moved so far from his idealistic beginnings is not explored but presented almost as a personal peculiarity, unconnected with the history of German idealism, as in the matter-offact statement: 'Schelling simply came to doubt that any kind of unitary system ... was possible, that all such systems presupposed a "final dichotomy" between thought (or reason) and being that could not be overcome and which therefore could only be stated in paradoxical sounding ways, such that "thought" (or "reason") has to acknowledge its dependence on its "other"' (p. 320). Surely this is a momentous enough departure from the Enlightenment narrative to warrant more examination. It is true, as far as it goes, to say that Schelling concluded in his middle period that 'we cannot rationally comprehend freedom' (p. 324). However, this was one of the results of his realisation of the limits of reason, not the cause of Schelling's abandonment of the idealistic tradition and turn towards positive philosophy. That Schelling explored the internal logic of idealism, and attempted to go beyond it, or that he is considered by some to have constituted its completion, is a claim well enough known to deserve either a mention or a counter-argument, especially in a book that tells a rather different story about the meaning and import of German Idealism.
5
The book's subtitle is 'the legacy of idealism'. One of Pinkard's more striking conclusions is that in the wake of the Berlin lectures Schelling gave after being called to assume Hegel's chair, 'Schelling's influence spread, even if only negatively. His attempt to supplant Hegel and the post-Kantians with his own idiosyncratic post-idealist Christian metaphysics only served to convince many on the Hegelian left that critique of religion was not an ancillary task, but, as Marx famously put it in the opening to his 1844 "Contribution to a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right": The criticism of religion is a prerequisite of all criticism'. He might as well have said: the criticism of Schelling is the prerequisite of everything else' (p. 331). If Schelling's despairing critique of the limits of the powers of reason (and therefore the renewed importance of a 'modern' conception of religion) was so galvanising for the left Hegelians, why are they not a part of the legacy of idealism? To raise this question is not to minimise the importance of Schopenhauer, who certainly saw himself as Kant's one rightful heir in a sea of unworthy pretenders, and Kierkegaard, who seized on the existential implications of the late Schelling's critique of Hegel and made them his own. I could not agree more strongly with Pinkard's claim that 'to see idealism as exhausted or defeated or even overcome is to miss the most important part of its legacy and how its central themes continued to contest those emerging after its heyday, even by those who most emphatically held it to have been decisively surmounted by what followed it' (p. 338). Yet I would not confine idealism's legacy to 'a new self-consciousness about how our norms are subject to challenge because of... modern self-consciousness' (p. 359). This gives the grand metaphysical doctrines, for which the thinkers of the period are also justly known, too little weight, and it omits altogether the hard-won awareness of the limits of reason that Schelling's acknowledgement of the problem of the intractability of the 'other' present us with, as reflected in his use of the ideas of Unvordenklichkeit and eternal beginning; there is a fleeting earlier mention of Schelling's influence on later naturalist, post-modern, and existentialist thought (p. 332), but this acknowledgement does not rise to the level of being included in the explicit discussion of idealism's legacy in the conclusion.
It is also dismaying to see Heine's old canard repeated that the aged Schelling complained endlessly to all who would listen that Hegel had stolen his ideas, and this presented in a context that suggested Schelling was deluding himself. One does not have to go so far as Frederick Beiser's recent claim that 'Hegel was not the creative and original thinker that his history suggests or his disciples imply* 6 or that Svhile Hegel has gone down in history as the grand representative of absolute idealism, his main achievement was to systematise ideas already formulated by his contemporaries' 7 to acknowledge that Hegel did owe more than he acknowledged, or perhaps realised, to other thinkers, Schelling among them.
The discussion of the circular relationship between cognition and practice in the thought of the early Fichte is thoughtfully presented, and helps to illuminate what Fichte must have meant by the term 'effective freedom', that is, the ability to form normative commitments and act appropriately given those commitments. However, I must object that the citation of Fichte's well-known statement in the 1797 'First Introduction to the Wissenscbaftslehrt that 'the kind of philosophy one chooses thus depends on the kind of person one is. ... Someone whose character is naturally slack ... will never be able to raise himself to the level of idealism' (p. 121) gives the impression that Fichte is the originator of the claim that philosophy is in some way dependent on character. Schelling's 'Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism' of 1796 makes the case that it is not possible to choose between the two types of philosophy on theoretical grounds, but rather Vhich of the two we choose depends upon the freedom of spirit we have ourselves acquired' (I, 1, 308). 8 One might also consider an honourable mention for Jacobi in this regard, inasmuch as he clearly thought of himself as making a key revelation about Lessing's character by unmasking him as Pinkard also points out, the end effect of this claim was rather more to elevate Spinoza's reputation than to tarnish Lessing's.
The succinct summary of Fichte's views on women's rights (tellingly invoked as one example of Fichte's inability to be entirely consistent with his radical reformulation of the doctrine of right) manages to be entirely faithful to what Fichte actually said and at the same time truly hilarious. My amusement at the cleverness of this presentation was only tempered by my disappointment that Hegel's views on women did not receive similarly witty dissection, though they are surely at least as absurd as Fichte's. Here, as in his biography of Hegel, Pinkard offers only rueful observations about Hegel's traditional views, somewhat oldfashioned even for his time and place, as expressed in his dealings with individual women such as Caroline Schlegel Schelling and Rahel Varnhagen as well as in his philosophical writing. 9 This restriction of the discussion of what Hegel defined as the feminine to the level of the merely biographical is to fail to come to terms philosophically with what is itself an important element in Hegel's understanding of rationality, and by extension, the prevailing view of reason in the modern era. To dismiss either Fichte or Hegel's views on women as largely the product of personal idiosyncrasy is to ignore a source of otherwise unobtainable insight into their picture of what it is to be human, and to live the best possible life. 10 If they were driven into inconsistency precisely in this area, what does that imply about their philosophical projects more generally? Pinkard has made a strong case that the power and the paradoxes of the idea of self-legislation are central to the enduring fascination of German Idealism. That I suggest that other avenues to the exploration of the idealistic concept of the self are also worthy of examination is in no way to be interpreted as tempering my respect for this ambitious and elegant book, which has broadened my horizons and helped me to make important connections between German idealism and contemporary philosophical concerns. Dale E. Snow Loyola College In Maryland Notes
